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Abstract 
Unlike in most Latin American cities, street vendors organized in farmers’ markets 
popularly known as ferias libres in Santiago de Chile, gained legal recognition early in 
the twentieth century. Since then, comunas,  or local municipalities, have provided 
vendors with individual licenses that stipulate the place and time of operations, and have 
defined a clear set of rules regarding customer service. However, this early legal 
recognition has not necessarily overcome the embedded conflict over the economic use 
of public space. As supermarkets become spatially positioned along the main streets 
within easy access of the city’s transportation system, feriantes, or licensed street 
vendors, are being relocated in less profitable areas. Moreover, coleros, or unlicensed 
vendors, are still flourishing despite efforts to restrict their numbers.   
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This paper argues that the current regulations regarding ferias promote market 
segmentation that is detrimental to both municipal control and ferias’ competitiveness. 
An analysis of their spatial distribution within the city identifies two key elements: (i) 
the probability of a feria being located in a particular neighbourhood is sensitive to the 
patterns of residential socioeconomic segregation experienced by the lower 
socioeconomic status households, and (ii) the number of unlicensed vendors decreases 
drastically in relation to the licensed vendors within the less segregated neighbourhoods. 
These results suggest that a more cautious allocation criteria may promote greater 
control for the comunas while preventing further market segmentation and 
stigmatization of the ferias. 
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In Santiago de Chile, street vendors working in farmers’ markets, known as ferias 
libres, achieved recognition as legitimate providers of agricultural produce in 1939 
(Salazar 2003: 83). In a context of food supply scarcity, urban planners found in ferias 
an alternative low cost solution to building public markets for serving a growing city 
that demanded agricultural produce at affordable prices. Although most vendors were 
not necessarily farmers, as they initially had been, ferias remained steadfast through the 
1980s within the upper-, middle- and lower-class residential areas. 
 
During the late twentieth century, supermarkets benefited from the concentration of 
agricultural production fostered by free trade policies, and started to offer competitive 
prices to a wider clientele. Initially dominant in central areas and upper-class 
neighbourhoods, supermarkets began relocating into the densely populated working 
class areas. Furthermore, the modernization of the city’s transportation system also 
contributed to their accessibility reaching consumers traditionally served by street 
vendors in the farmers’ markets. 
 
Due to aggressive spatial competition, ferias may potentially be disadvantaged if the 
location factor is not controlled. In cities such as Lima, Mexico City, and Quito, where 
street markets are not strongly regulated, the site of the street market is up to the 
vendors, who tend to favour central areas in order to access a greater number of 
potential customers. Due to their informal nature, these vendors defend their ‘gained’ 
locations as their irrefutable right to pursue market opportunities, and often persist 
despite urban renewal or gentrification by supermarkets. Instead in Santiago de Chile, 
legislation giving legal recognition to the ferias empowered the comunas (local 
municipalities) to decide on the allocation of farmers’ markets1 to specific streets in 
order to diminish their negative effects and to maximize consumer benefits. However, 
the ferias are still marginalized in urban planning. None of the urban renewal projects 
related to Transantiago, the massive transportation system, has recognized the needs of 
the ferias in their designs. Instead, they have been relocated to backstreets far from their 
original attractive commercial areas. 
 
How is the current regulation affecting the market opportunities of the ferias in the 
competitive environment? What are the consequences of the allocation practices for 
their image and competitiveness within the city? This document aims to answer these 
questions by providing a spatial analysis depicting the ferias’ choice of location and 
disentangling the neighbourhood effects of residential segregation and gentrification on 
the populace of feriantes (licensed vendors) and coleros (unlicensed vendors). I start 
with a review of the overall nature of the regulations governing the ferias and the 
implications of these for their market opportunity. 
                                                 
1 Throught this paper, ferias and farmers’ markets are used interchangeably. 2 
2  Regulation and its implications 
The regulations on ferias libres in Santiago de Chile mainly govern the administration 
of the economic use of public space. The central components concern the choice of 
location, operating schedules, procedures for market access, and the norms and 
sanctions regarding customer service. Each of these components has important 
consequences on ferias’ competitiveness.   
2.1  Location and operating schedule 
Comunas define the location and operating schedule in which the ferias may operate. 
Location, with due consideration for the opinion of neighbourhood associations, is 
established based on reports from the transportation department estimating how the feria 
would impact on the transit flow; and the Secretary of Communal Planning, evaluating 
suitability of zoning for economic activities. General criterion promotes the selection of 
streets that are paved, low in traffic, furthest away from pollution sources, and those that 
would not cause inconvenience to the resident population. Each location can be used on 
a particular weekday (Tuesday to Sunday) from eight o’clock in the morning to three or 
four o’ clock in the afternoon.  
 
The allocation of a feria site is renewable or may be changed by the comunas at any 
time, and in some cases, a particular location is restricted to a time-limit of one year. 
The willingness to incorporate the feriantes in the decision-making process is 
conditional on local politics. In many comunas, location decisions are neither term-
binding nor contingent upon prior consultations with licensed vendors. The allocation 
criteria, as currently in effect, may intrinsically favour some neighbourhoods. It is easier 
to set up ferias within neighbourhoods where private cars are not the main source of 
transportation, and thus residents would not be bothered by the installation of farmer’s 
markets. Only 19 per cent of 364 ferias studied (out of a total number of 406 in 
Santiago) operate in areas such plazas or parks instead of the street; only 17 per cent 
provide parking facilities for their customers (ODEPA-USACH 2008). Customers are 
likely to be residents who live nearby. According to a survey administered in July 2005, 
approximately 85 per cent of ferias’ customers were within a 9-11 minute walking 
distance: this could indicate that the possible area of influence of a feria to be limited to 
a maximum one-kilometre radius (Aliaga 2006a: 18).  
 
Ferias can serve a larger clientele by working in different locations. Almost 70 per cent 
of the residents shop at least once a week in the ferias (ODEPA-USACH 2008: 4). 
Nevertheless, each feria is generally located at one particular site, operating either once 
(46 per cent) or twice a week (53 per cent). As Map 1 shows, ferias in comparison to 
supermarkets are more widespread throughout the city, but their locations differ, as they 
tend to be closer to areas with a higher proportion of lower socioeconomic households. 
An examination based on an mean travel time on Tuesdays to Sundays would indicate 
that approximately 6 per cent, 19 per cent and 75 per cent of the customers come from 
high-, middle- and lower socioeconomic status households, respectively (Aliaga 2006a: 
26).  
 
The standard operational schedule restricts evening activities in order to avoid 
additional investments by the comuna for lighting or security. This limits the clientele to 
those who have the time to shop in the mornings, as opposed to supermarkets, which 3 
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achieve their highest weekday sales peak between 6 to 9 pm (ODEPA-USACH 2008: 
28). Based on a conservative perspective, this implies that those most likely to shop in 
the mornings are women who work either part-time or not at all. Even though female 
labourforce participation in Chile is low compared to other Latin American countries 
(World Bank 2005), the younger women in Santiago (Contreras, Puentes and Bravo 
2005) are increasingly participating in the workforce. In the long run, this may make the 

























2.2 Market  access 
The allocation of vending posts inside the ferias is governed by a licence granted by the 
local municipality which also determine the costs and stipulations. Most comunas 
establish a fee based on the land value assigned by the internal revenue service 
according to the law of public goods use. The fee may include payment for the 
commercial right as well as other costs such as cleaning or security services. A number 
of comunas; however, particularly upper-class such as Providencia, consider each feria 
as a special case basis and have established a ‘social’ cost for the license rather than 
basing the cost in terms of land tax. In these cases, access is restricted to the current 
number of feriantes; in case of death or abandonment, license is not available to new 
applicants nor transferred to other family members of former feriantes.  
 
Feriantes, or licensed vendors, are obligated to respect the regulations governing feria 
location and operating schedules, to have their licence readily visible for easy 
inspection, and to take part in the expenses for mutual services maintained by the 
vendors’ association, such as chemical bathrooms, etc. A feriante is obligated to work in 
Map 1 
Location of ferias and supermarkets in Santiago de Chile 
according to the percentage of low SES households in the neighbourhoods 
Source: SIFL (2005), ASOF; Population Census (2002), Supermarket Directory (2005), INE. 4 
his assigned spot during the stipulated days and times, since a long unjustified absence 
can count towards forfeit of licence.  
 
The main preconditions for obtaining a licence include availability of posts at the site, 
the applicant having no prior commercial business venture as well as residing in the 
comuna in which the licence is being requested. Few municipalities require registration 
with the health insurance and social security authorities. They may ask the applicant to 
verify his residency by requesting additional documentation (such as utility bills), or, 
dependent on the type of product to be sold, to obtain sanitary licenses. Inspectors can 
also visit the applicant unannounced. However, there is evidence to suggest that the 
residency ruling has been side-stepped by an applicant temporarily moving to a 
relative’s address until the license has been approved (Aliaga 2006b: 59). Comunas with 
a higher proportion of upper-class residents usually have licensed vendors who do not 
live within the actual municipality but whose operations were linked to producer 
activities at the time the feria was founded. 
 
The department of commercial patents and inspection in each comuna supervises that 
area size and the number of licences of the feria do not exceed stipulations articulated in 
the founding decree. In some comunas, the applicant may need a letter of acceptance 
from the local feria organization. On inquiry, most municipalities generally deny the 
availability of licenses, and finding a spot is left to the individual’s connections. At 
times, the mayor or some high-ranking public official may issue a special petition for a 
social case, and in many cases, representatives of the ferias may provide letters of 
recommendation without prior consultation with the association. The licence is 
renewable each season, and can be terminated by the comunas at any time. It cannot be 
transferred to another person who is not working in the same stall, although some 
communities may give preference to relatives in the case of death or disability.  
 
The objective of the licence is to minimize the adverse effects associated with the 
increase of licensed vendors, such as noise, additional garbage, traffic jams, or possible 
increase in robberies due to the accumulation of people. Urban planners in each comuna 
decide on the optimal size of the ferias based on how much the street width allows 
occupancy. Nevertheless, the number of licences among the younger ferias, if analysed 
according to the year of issue, shows a decreasing or stagnant trend while the coleros’ 
average per licence is certainly on the rise (Figures 1 and 2). It could be argued that 
because  the number of licences is increasingly restricted, many residents in the 
respective comuna have recently opted to operate unlicensed as coleros.2 It has been 
estimated that almost a half of the feriantes had worked as licensed vendors for at least 
17 years (ODEPA-USACH 2008: 6), while 50 per cent of the coleros had less than one 
year of work experience, and 42 per cent had a maximum of three years.. 
                                                 























Licenses per street Market Linear (Licenses per street Market)
Source: Author’s calculations based on SIFL (2005). 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on SIFL (2005).  
 
The municipalities try to restrict unlicensed vendors by confiscating their merchandise. 
However, some municipalities, such Renca and La Granja, have decided to issue partial 
licenses to this group, at half the fee of the actual permit (Aliaga 2006b: 61-2; 
Stillerman  2006: 518). Since supervision of the coleros is the responsibility of the 
inspectors, the ferias’ associations have little opportunity to block access to their 
market. Similar experiences of unemployment among the feriantes may trigger some 
sympathy towards the coleros. A recent study estimated that 39 per cent of the licensed 
vendors had been unemployed before they obtained the necessary permits 
(ODEPA-USACH 2008: 6). Moreover, neighbourhoods with high unemployment rates 
may be more tolerant of the coleros as farmers’ markets may also offer an opportunity 
for other income-generating activities as well. According to a study, 83 per cent of the 
Figure 1 
Number of licences per feria according to the year of set-up, 1939-2004 
Figure 2 
Average number of coleros per licence according to year of feria set-up, 1944-2004 6 
coleros work within their home municipality, and in 79 per cent of the case working at 
the ferias constitutes their main source of income, working generally 74 per cent of the 
time at the same location. Moreover, this study estimated that 12 per cent of the 
neighbours provide some type of service—such storage of merchandise or preparing 
breakfast—to either feriantes or coleros (Pavez et al. 2004: 129). Consequently, being 
unable to control the size of the ferias may be a response to the need for local sources of 
employment. 
2.3 Customer  service 
Inspectors in each community visit ferias daily to supervise compliance with customer 
service norms, in addition to checking for absenteeism. The general norms establish that 
stalls must comply with established dimensions; prohibited or inferior quality products 
are not to be sold, working under the influence of alcohol is forbidden, as is the use of 
informal electric installations; weight value must not be falsified; nor is the authority of 
the inspectors’ to be resisted. The sanctions are graded according to the gravity of the 
offence.  There are four levels of sanctions: a caution or ticket, a fine, confiscation, or 
cancellation of licence. Three warnings entail a fine in most comunas. Confiscation or 
termination of licence is applied mostly in cases of repeated offenses or if the products 
are sold in dangerous or adulterated condition. Once confiscation occurs, the feriante is 
banned from re-applying for a licence or his licence is suspended up to three years. 
 
Comunas allow only certain types of products to be sold. These include agricultural 
produce, seafood, meat, groceries, and the like. Certain communities may allow the sale 
of clothing or other related articles. In some instances, the municipality may stipulate 
the percentage of non-food products that can be traded, while in others, any non-food 
product may be prohibited. Regulations stipulate that the delivery of perishable food 
products requires special provisions: a vendor must have an isothermal or refrigeration 
system for seafood and meat. All food vendors are required to have a sanitary 
certificate, while the regulations in some comunas even demand specific clothing 
(gloves, hats, aprons). 
 
Customer service norms have encouraged feriantes to improve sanitary conditions even 
within socially disadvantaged comunas. For instance, in 1992, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) at the United Nations promoted a project for the 
improvement of the temporary stalls selling fish and sea products. Cerro Navia, one of 
the poorest comunas in Santiago, managed to have all licensed vendors selling food, 
fish and meat using the updated stalls and registered for temporary sanitary checking. 
Moreover, a recent study reported that one third of feriantes are increasing security by 
contracting private guards and 72 per cent are developing marketing initiatives such ‘El 
cliente elige’ (Let the client choose), which consists on letting customers select the 
products themselves, a practise common particularly in the upper-class residential areas 
(ODEPA-USACH 2008). Despite the advances being made, progress is sporadic. Pavez, 
Rautenberg and Lee Mira (2004: 130) find that 85 per cent of the neighbours living in 
the proximity of the ferias in the southwest communities that have with a higher 
proportion of working-class residents, claim that the markets attract sanitary hazards 
such street dogs, insects and mice.  7 
3  Distribution of the Ferias Libres, residential segregation and gentrification 
In Latin America, there is a growing concern about the effects of residential 
segregation, not just because of issues related to land prices or housing markets, but also 
because it could potentially affect social integration. Initially, cities exhibited a macro-
scale centre-periphery model of residential segregation: the poor lived in the outskirts 
with little provision of services and unstable tenure, while the middle and upper classes 
occupied central areas. Recent research shows that residential segregation—
characterized by scattered concentrations of wealth or poverty (Sabatini 2003)—is 
becoming more evident on the micro-scale either because of social mobility or the 
expansion of gated communities. Sabatini finds that in Chile micro-scale residential 
segregation of the urban poor was in later years more strongly associated with social 
exclusion indicators such as teenage pregnancy, youth inactivity, or higher 
unemployment rates (Sabatini et al. 2001). Based to this evidence, some scholars have 
hypothesized that some of the segregation mechanisms could be related to the 
stigmatization of certain poor neighbourhoods (Katzman 1999). Evaluating whether or 
not the ferias’ prevalence within the poorer neighbourhoods is significantly sensitive to 
the observed residential segregation patterns will contribute to the identification of 
possible trends of tolerance or acceptance of the ferias as a sustainable economic 
practice.  
 
We use the 2005 Information System of Ferias Libres (SIFL, Spanish acronym) 
produced by the Asociación Chilena de Ferias Libres (ASOF, Spanish acronym), which 
contains cartographic and attribute information on 401 ferias. Using the 1992 and 2002 
population census, households’ socioeconomic status (SES) is computed with a score 
based on two variables: educational attainment of the head of the household and 
possession of goods.3 Based on this score, the socioeconomic status groups rank from 
ABC1 (the highest) to C3, D, and E (the lower classes).4 Throughout the paper we 
define the lower socioeconomic status group as composed of C3, D and E. For 
computing residential segregation indexes, the number of households in each SES 
category is aggregated at the block and census tract level. 
 
Using the ASOF dataset, a dummy variable indicating whether or not a feria has been 
located in a neighbourhood is computed as the dependent variable. The interaction or 
exposure index, applying the residential segregation indicators, measures the degree to 
                                                 
3 The author of this classification is Claudio Contreras, a professional geographer, who calculated it in the 
context of a project oriented to elaborate the socioeconomic map of Chile, co-ordinated by ADIMARK, a 
marketing agency operating in Santiago de Chile. 
4 The breakdown of the SES groups: 
    1992, % 2002, %
highest ABC1  7.1 10.9
middle class  C2  10.5 23.3
low-middle class C3  29.8 33.5
lower class  D  23.7 29.3
lower class  E  12.4 19.6.
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which a lower SES household interacts with a higher status household within the 
neighbourhood. At the other end, the isolation index measures the degree to which the 
poorest SES households (D and E) interact with other similar SES households in the 
neighbourhood. The dissimilarity index is a measure of evenness. That is, it calculates 
the percentage of lower SES households that would need to move to achieve an even 
distribution within the residential blocks. In terms of gentrification, the model includes 
the percentage increase of high SES households from 1992 to 2002. It also includes an 
indicator of whether or not supermarkets were located in the area. Supermarket 
locations were geo-referenced using the 2005 Supermarket Directory for the 
Metropolitan Region of Santiago de Chile elaborated by the Chilean National Institute 
of Statistics (INE, Spanish acronym). The assembled dataset contains information on 
the 879 neighbourhoods approached using the census tract delimitations. 
 
The approach chosen to perform the analysis is the logistic geographically weighted 
regression (GWR). GWR is a technique that extends the traditional regression method 
to examine variability in space. It nonlinearly models the local coefficient estimates and 
adjusted measures for a global pattern, using a fixed kernel with Cartesian co-ordinates 
indicating the variability range of the parameters. Given the differences in terms of the 
administration of the markets by the Santiago municipalities, exploring the significance 
and strength of the local parameters can contribute to identifying the zones that merit a 
closer look for policy-making.  
 
Table 1 presents the results of the global logistic GWR, predicting changes in the 
probability of a feria being established in a neighbourhood according to the selected 
residential segregation and gentrification indicators. Compared to supermarkets whose 
probability of allocation is 15 per cent, the probability for a feria is 44 per cent, or 
considerably higher when the operating day of the week is ignored. However, if taken 
on the basis of a single weekday, the allocation probability for the feria is very close to 
that observed for the supermarkets. Supermarkets are the city’s only providers on 
Mondays, while ferias operate Tuesdays to Sundays in almost 15 per cent of the 
neighbourhoods. According to our analysis, if other parameters are held constant, the 
log odds of a feria serving a neighbourhood on any given day of the week is higher than 
supermarkets, but lower for each working day and even negative for Sundays. 
 
Contrary to supermarkets, the interaction of lower SES with higher SES households 
decreases the probability of feria services more consistently for all days of the week. 
While the presence of both supermarkets and ferias is negatively associated with the 
isolation of poor households, it weakly reduces the probability of service from the ferias 
on any day of the week, and on Saturdays and Tuesdays. Consequently, existence of the 
ferias is not as strongly related to the segregation of the urban poor as it is sensitive to 
the degree to which lower SES households interact with families of higher SES. The 
dissimilarity index shows no significant relationship either for the presence of ferias or 
supermarkets, which corroborates the observation that the overrepresentation of the 
poor is not related to ferias location but rather to their exposure to middle-class or 
upper-class households. This implies that existence of the ferias is dependent on a 
consensus achieved in balancing the needs of various socioeconomic groups. 9 
 
Table 1 
Global model diagnostics and coefficients from GWR logistic regression  









































































Probability,  %  15.60  44.76  15.36 15.70 14.90  14.33  13.88  15.02 
Bandwith  7767.30  7767.30 29089.82 29089.82 29089.82 8156.16  29089.82 29089.82













































































































* p-value <0.05, Standard errors given in parentheses. 
 
In terms of gentrification, while the presence of a supermarket has no effect on the 
presence of ferias in a neighbourhood, the increase of high SES households is weakly 
and negatively associated to the existence of ferias on any weekday, or on Saturday and 
on Tuesday. As the spread of supermarkets shows a similar relationship, it can be stated 
that the presence of wealthier families is related to commercially free residential areas.  
 
The local models do not show a substantial reduction of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) but provide more effective parameters (see Annex 1). That is, for some 
neighbourhoods the parameters selected are statistically significant, showing that in 100 
per cent and 75 per cent of the study areas the supermarket presence is estimated to be 
negatively associated with isolation and, albeit weakly, with the increase of high SES 
households, respectively. Ferias presence, in 100 per cent, 75 per cent, and 75 per cent 
of the study area, is estimated to be negatively associated with interaction, isolation and 
the increase of high SES households, respectively. Availability of the feria on Sundays, 
Fridays, Thursdays, and Wednesdays shows a consistent 100 per cent negative 
association with interaction. On Saturdays and Tuesdays, presence is 100 per cent 
negatively associated with isolation and the increase of high SES households.  
 
Nevertheless, the parameters selected do not show greater local variation, a condition in 
which the inter-quartile range in the local model is greater than two times the standard 
error for the parameter in the global model. Still, zones in which residential segregation 10 
and gentrification of neighbourhoods negatively affect the presence of ferias on any day 
of the week can be visualized using the local GWR t-values for significant parameters. 
The blue areas of Map 2, 3 and 4 represent neighbourhoods in which t-values are lower 
than -1.95; that is, in which parameters have a negative statistically significant spatial 
relationship to the presence of ferias. Ferias are most negatively associated with 
isolation in the southeast while interaction has a negative spatial relationship in most of 
the city, particularly the area ranging from the upper part of downtown to the south. 
While the presence of supermarkets is not significant to determine allocation in any 
neighbourhood, the increase of high SES has a wider effect, ranging from the northwest 

















The fact that in certain zones of the city the presence of ferias is associated with forms 
of residential segregation and gentrification of the upper classes, points to the 
observation that the current regulation practice in these zones is, perhaps 
unintentionally, segmenting market opportunities of the ferias towards lower SES 
households. 
4  Effects of residential segregation on licence enforcement 
As the feria sites bind market opportunities to specific areas, the balance between the 
needs and expectations of the area’s residents not only affects the probability of 
allocation but also the performance of farmers’ markets themselves. The 2005 SIFL 
dataset provides information on the estimated number of coleros and feriantes for 112 
and 267 ferias, respectively. We use this information to analyse whether or not 
residential segregation in terms of the degree of interaction between the lower and 
higher SES households significantly affects both population groups, previously 
normalized using natural logs. For control variables, we introduce dummy variables 
corresponding to the downtown and northeast comunas, characterized by a higher 
capacity for enforcement such as that seen in central Santiago and the northeast, as well 








Increase of high SES households 11 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the OLS model predicting the number of licensed 
(feriantes) and unlicensed (coleros) vendors. A unit increase of the interaction of lower 
SES households reduces the number of feriantes and coleros by 0.31 and 0.54, 
respectively. Interaction noticeably reduces the number of coleros even when factors 
such as comunas with better enforcement and unemployment rates of the 
neighbourhoods are controlled for. It can be stated with 99 per cent confidence that 
comunas other than those at downtown and in the northeast are expected to have 3.33 
coleros more, when controlling for neighbourhood differences in residential segregation 
and unemployment rates. The persistent suppressant residential segregation overpowers 
the anticipated increasing effect of neighbourhood unemployment, suggesting that a 
more integrated community could benefit from a balance between the need for 
employment and expectations from supervising the ferias. 
Table 2 
OLS regression coefficients for the estimated effects of segregation, local unemployment rates 
 on the number of licensed vendors (feriantes) and unlicensed vendors (coleros) 
  Licensed vendors 










Comunas (downtown-northeast=1)    -0.42* 
(0.12) 
   -0.60 
(0.37) 
Unemployment rate    0.10 
(0.05) 










N 267  267    112  112 
R
2 15.0  20.1    14.2  16.4 
Adjusted R
2 14.7  19.2    13.4  14.1 
*p-value < 0.001, standard errors given in parentheses. 
5  Working towards a legislation to sanction competition 
Unlike other Latin American cities where policy attempts to relocate vendors from the 
streets have had limited success (Guerrero 2001; Lawrence and Castro 2006), the 
regulation of ferias in Santiago de Chile has shown that street markets can be regulated 
and promoted. However, as observed, the current regulations and particularly the 
allocation practice can also become a tool to segment their markets, thus intensifying 
social exclusion. A legislative project has been proposed to congress, which considers 
outsourcing streets for a 10-year period, favouring the feriantes. Hector Tejada, 
President of ASOF, defends his position by asserting:  
We want legislation that can be a tool which allows us to compete, and 
this is a responsibility because as a distribution channel, we support 
300,000 small farmers throughout the whole sector, assisting to distribute 
their products throughout the city. Thus, we are talking about one million 
jobs. Nowadays, although we control 80 per cent of the sales in fruit and 
vegetables, there is aggressive competition with the supermarkets, which 
are essaying new ways to compete with small trade, and this directly 
affects our market. In this sense, we need to improve legislation and the 
system of property of public space, we need an outsourcing of the streets 
(22
nd July 2005, Parliamentary Meeting) (author’s translation). 12 
 
The discussion and approval of this legislation has been delayed since 2005. The 
updated 2008 version of SIFL reports that feria locations are still the same 
(ODEPA-USACH 2008). Outsourcing the streets for ferias seeks to promote more 
investment for the provision of lighting, parking and restrooms in their market space. 
Thus, a more detailed analysis of current locations is needed. A case study on Macul, a 
community located near downtown southern Santiago, advocates increasing centrality in 
the decision-making process for establishing ferias, as this could increase potential 
benefits for consumers and may also invest public areas with a better agglomeration of 
services (Troncoso Melo 2009). 
 
Ferias are competitive not only because they offer affordable prices and articulate the 
traditional agricultural chains of small farming in the city but also because they 
reproduce a unique cultural experience that integrates social groups within their market 
practices. As ferias are more likely to exist in neighbourhoods where poor households 
have less interaction with the higher SES households, these locations segregate their 
clientele, having potential negative effects for competitiveness. Segregated locations 
may increase the stigma that ferias offer an inferior form of consumption and 
consequently may reduce incentives to improve service. Moreover, as greater 
unemployment rates are prevalent among the lower SES neighbourhoods, the need for 
employment opportunities may indirectly promote unfair competition for the feriantes 
as well as limit the capacity of the comuna to enforce supervision. 
 
Consequently, it can be suggested that a more cautious location policy that promotes 
greater interaction between different socioeconomic households could balance the need 
to shop and work, and could support the interests necessary to adequately manage the 
use of public space. From a market perspective, ferias in more attractive locations could 
encourage a more competitive attitude, and improve the quality of service. This 
outcome could materialize in Santiago de Chile, since legal recognition of the feria 
implies a social contract that is based on acceptance by the neighbourhood, and above 
all, since the feriantes are responsive to  customers’ demands. 
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Annex 1 
Local coefficients from the GWR logistic regression to explain street markets allocation 
      
Effective
parameters AIC    









quartile Max     
Constant  0.39 0.71 1.13  1.44  6.53  1.398  0.730 
Interaction -8.13  0.52  1.11  1.42  1.93  1.686  0.900 
Isolation  -9.95 -5.64 -4.99  -4.12  -3.61  1.688  1.520 
Dissimilarity -0.86  0.29  1.31  2.18  4.69  3.504  1.890 
Increase in high SES  -0.07  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  0.01  0.028  0.020 
            





quartile Max     
Constant -0.79  1.24  1.48  2.33  4.62  1.476  1.090 
Interaction  -4.05 -3.29 -2.74  -2.12  -1.19  1.614  1.170 
Isolation -4.41  -2.2  -1.38  -1.07  1.0  1.626  1.130 
Dissimilarity -1.38  0.15  0.62  0.99  1.32  1.516  0.840 
Increase in high SES  -0.07  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0  0.028  0.010 
Presence of supermarkets  -0.32  -0.18  -0.07  0.03  0.71  0.436  0.210 
Tuesdays           6.61 709.04    
Constant 0.86  0.9  0.93  0.96  1.04  1.436  0.060 
Interaction  -2.91 -2.79 -2.73  -2.69  -2.62  1.868  0.100 
Isolation  -2.14 -2.07 -2.05  -2.04  -1.99  1.666  0.030 
Dissimilarity  -1.55 -1.33 -1.26  -1.18  -1.07  2.234  0.150 
Increase in high SES  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  0.05  0.000 
Presence of supermarkets  -0.28  -0.26  -0.26  -0.25  -0.24  0.654  0.010 
Wednesdays      6.62 684.97     
Constant -0.03  0.05  0.07  0.08  0.12  1.404  0.030 
Interaction  -2.92 -2.83 -2.78  -2.73  -2.61  1.846  0.100 
Isolation  -1.83 -1.81 -1.8  -1.79  -1.78  1.654  0.020 
Dissimilarity 0.37  0.5  0.55  0.59  0.79  2.100  0.090 
Increase In high SES  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  0.046  0.000 
Presence of supermarkets  0.35  0.37  0.38  0.38  0.4  0.582  0.010 
Thursdays      14.32  684.93    
Constant -0.48  0.11  0.24  0.48  2.49  1.434  0.370 
Interaction  -4.87 -4.01 -3.52  -2.93  -1.1  1.922  1.080 
Isolation  -3.54 -1.52 -1.27  -1.14  -0.48  1.674  0.380 
Dissimilarity  -3.86 -1.19 -0.86  -0.66  -0.42  2.244  0.530 
Increase in high SES  -0.11  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.054  0.010 
Presence of supermarkets  -1.49  -0.68  -0.25  0.14  0.47  0.672  0.820* 
           Con’t 
*Local variation exists when interquartile range (local)>2* standard error for the parameter (global) 15 
Annex 1 (continued) 
Local coefficients from the GWR logistic regression to explain street markets allocation 
      
Effective
parameters AIC    





Fridays           6.62 721.75    
Constant 0.2  0.22  0.23  0.24  0.27  1.432  0.020 
Interaction -2.52  -2.5  -2.49  -2.48  -2.42  1.854  0.020 
Isolation  -1.67 -1.64 -1.62  -1.61  -1.57  1.666  0.030 
Dissimilarity -0.27  -0.2  -0.19  -0.18  -0.16  0.096  0.020 
Increase in high SES  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  0.044  0.000 
Presence of supermarkets  -0.49  -0.46  -0.45  -0.44  -0.41  0.670  0.020 
Saturdays           6.61 736.77    
Constant  0.75 0.84 0.89  0.95  1.1  1.414  0.110 
Interaction  -2.56 -2.49 -2.46  -2.42  -2.3  1.782  0.070 
Isolation -2.7  -2.54  -2.48  -2.43  -2.33  1.64  0.110 
Dissimilarity  -0.19 -0.09 -0.06  -0.02  0.11  2.088  0.070 
Increase in high SES  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.044  0.000 
Presence of supermarkets  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.16  0.19  0.572  0.020 
Sundays           6.63 727.65    
Constant  -0.29 -0.25 -0.24  -0.23  -0.19  1.402  0.020 
Interaction  -3.36 -3.23 -3.2  -3.17  -3.1  1.832  0.060 
Isolation -1  -0.96  -0.94  -0.92  -0.86  1.636  0.040 
Dissimilarity  -0.35 -0.29 -0.27  -0.26  -0.24  2.046  0.030 
Increase in high SES  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.042  0.000 
Presence of supermarkets  0.33  0.37  0.4  0.42  0.48  0.568  0.050 
Source: see text.  
 
 
 
 